Soviet Union for its invasion into Afghanistan by analyzing declassified Soviet and American documents, while offering a historical critique of prior interpretations of the invasion.
At the time of the Soviet invasion, and for the decades which have followed it, analysts have posited that the invasion of Afghanistan was a major strategic advance by the Soviet Union as well as a setback to the United States and its Western allies. In 1988, Roseanne Klass of Freedom House expressed the following viewpoints in Foreign Affairs:
On April 27, 1978, after two centuries of Russian efforts to gain a foothold, the Soviet Union seized virtual control of Afghanistan through a bloody coup carried out by its agents in the Afghan air force and tank corps under the guidance of the Soviet Embassy in Kabul…The Soviet Union then dug in for a long-term war of subjugation along lines developed in its century-long conquest of Central Asia; in addition to the military action, the Soviets began the systematic creation of an infrastructure for permanent political and economic control. 
While innumerable interpretations of the causative factors of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan have been put forward, the thematic undertones to the majority of interpretations are characterized by the notion of a "big-bad" Soviet Union hoping to disrupt the status quo. In 1 Roseanne Klass, "Afghanistan: The Accords, " Foreign Affairs 66, no. 5 (1988) Soviets were aware that the rivaling factions of the PDPA had been using internecine fighting "to strengthen the positions and influence of their groups for the right to 'represent the leadership in a legal bind.
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On March 18, however, the tone of the Politburo members had changed. Having had time to reflect on the situation, the consensus of the group moved in opposition of direct intervention -recognizing that it could be a costly mistake. KGB chief Yuri
Andropov set the tone of the meeting with his remarks:
We must consider very, very seriously the question of whose cause we will be supporting if we deploy our forces into Afghanistan. It's completely clear to us that Afghanistan is not ready at this time to resolve all of the issues it faces through socialism. We know Lenin's teaching about a revolutionary situation. Whatever situation we are talking about in Afghanistan, it is not that type of situation.
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Andropov was succeeded by Gromyko, who had also changed his mind and supported Andropov's decision not to invade:
I completely support Comrade Andropov's proposal…one must ask, and what would we gain? Afghanistan with its present government, with a backward economy, with inconsequential weight in international affairs. On the other side, we must keep in mind that from a legal point of view too we would not be justified in sending troops. Taraki, March 20, 1979. 30 Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Soviet Representatives in Kabul, September 15, 1979. building. The Soviet's relationship with Amin, however, was complicated and fragile. Considering the military-political situation in the Middle East, the latest appeal of the government of Afghanistan has been favorably considered. The decision has been made to introduce several contingents of Soviet troops deployed in southern regions of the country to the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in order to given international aid to the friendly Afghan people and also to create favorable conditions to interdict possible anti-Afghan actions from neighboring countries.
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Three days after the directive was signed, Soviet forces would begin moving into Afghanistan to seize control.
On the evening of December 27, 1979, Operation Storm was completed following the successful takeover of the Tajbeg Palace outside Kabul and the assassination of Afghan President Hafizullah Amin. With Amin exterminated, the Soviets were able to install Karmal Babrak, a Parchamist, into power. On the same day as the assassination on Amin, Brezhnev wrote to Babrak to express his congratulations on Babrak's rise to power:
I heartily congratulate you on [your] election as General Secretary of the PDPA and high government posts of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. In the name of the Soviet leadership and on behalf of myself personally I wish you great success in all your multifarious activity for the good of the Afghan people. I am confident that in the present circumstances the Afghan people will be able to defend the gains of the April Revolution, the sovereignty, the independence, and the national dignity of the new Afghanistan. 
